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Abstract 
We find that multi-bank holding companies (MBHCs) in the U.S. have lower insolvency risk than 
single-bank holding companies (SBHCs) at the parent level, but have significantly higher 
insolvency risk than the latter at the subsidiary level. Our results suggest that MBHC parents tend 
to benefit from the internal capital market while allowing for more risk-taking at the individual 
levels. We further find that the higher risk for MBHC affiliates is because of the organizational and 
geographic complexity at the MBHC parent level. Our results highlight the importance of 
government regulation on banks at both parent and subsidiary levels.  
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1. Introduction 
Ever since the passage of the 1956 Bank Holding Company Act, bank holding companies 
(BHCs) have become dominant in the U.S. banking industry. As of 2012, BHCs as a group 
controlled well over $15 trillion in total assets, more than 95% of all U.S. banking assets (Avraham 
et al. 2012). Although the literature has suggested numerous operational advantages of BHC 
structure, concerning reduced restrictions on scale and scope in various banking activities and 
greater flexibility in financing at both the parent and subsidiary levels (Pozdena 1988), it is not clear 
in both theory and empirical evidence whether BHC structure provides an additional layer of 
protection for their subsidiaries. We attempt to address this question in this paper.  
Specifically, we investigate the differences in insolvency risk between Single-BHC (SBHC) 
and Multi-BHC (MBHC) at their subsidiary levels. We apply internal capital market theory and 
complexity theory to form our hypotheses. First, we postulate that MBHC affiliates have lower 
insolvency risk than SBHC affiliates, all else being equal. Diversification at the parent level 
enhances the parents’ ability to obtain better external financing deals to create internal capital market 
and enrich the internal financing available to their subsidiaries (Khanna and Palepu 2000), thereby 
increasing the ability of the parent to relieve financial difficulties faced by their affiliates. The 
creation of internal capital market is regarded as ‘source-of-strength’ effect, which states that a 
parent can raise internal funds by divesting a non-banking subsidiary to rescue a troubled banking 
subsidiary. Literature on business groups also argues that business groups enable members to share 
risk by reallocating resources (Marisetty and Subrahmanyam 2010, Gopalan et al. 2007, Khanna 
and Yafeh 2005, Ferris et al. 2003). 
A competing hypothesis is that MBHC affiliates have higher insolvency risk than SBHC 
affiliates, as suggested by complexity theory. In the wake of deregulation, MBHCs have become 
more organizationally complex over the past two decades in terms of the number of separate legal 
affiliates and their geographic locations (Cetorelli and Goldberg 2014, Cetorelli et al. 2014, 
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Avraham et al. 2012). On the one hand, complexity theory argues that agency problems between 
the managers of the  parent and affiliates in the organizational hierarchy structure decrease the 
investment efficiency of subsidiaries (Rajan et al. 2000, Scharfstein and Stein 2000). On the other 
hand, complexity theory posits that a competitive environment exists in the hierarchy structure (Pina 
e Cunha and Vieira da Cunha 2006, Anderson 1999). Complexity theory also centers on the limited 
ability of the parent to equitably provide resources for all of its subsidiaries as the parent adopts 
increasingly complex structures due to diversification (Kahn and Winton 2004, DeYoung 2003, 
Hughes et al. 1999).  
 We use a sample of U.S. commercial banks between 1994 and 2012 to test these two 
hypotheses. Our descriptive statistics show that MBHC affiliates are larger, more diversified and 
have more off-balance-sheet activities. We find that MBHC affiliates tend to have higher levels of 
insolvency risk (measured as the Z-score) than SBHC affiliates. These results are consistent with 
the complexity hypothesis, but not with the internal capital market hypothesis.  
However, an important issue that may arise when attempting to estimate the riskiness of 
different types of banks is that the choice of banks to become such types may be endogenous. Our 
identification strategy seeks to address the endogeneity of the bank type decision by applying a 
propensity score matching (PSM)-based pairwise difference-in-differences approach. Specifically, 
we consider those banks which change status from SBHC affiliates into MBHC affiliates, i.e. the 
parent of an SBHC becomes an MBHC. We match the SBHC affiliates that changed status 
(treatment) with those SBHC affiliates that did not (control), using the propensity score matching 
method. We then adopt the difference-in-differences identification strategy to investigate whether 
the difference in insolvency risk between the treatment and control groups increases after the status 
changes of the treatment group. We find that SBHC affiliates changing into MBHC affiliates 
increase their level of risk, as compared to those controlled SBHC affiliates, therefore reaffirming 
our main results.  
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Next, we employ causal mediation analysis to test whether complexity is the channel that 
drives our main findings. We consider three different dimensions of bank complexity, 
organizational, geographic and business complexity, at the parent bank holding company level. We 
follow Cetorelli and Goldberg (2014) and measure organizational complexity as the total number 
of bank and non-bank subsidiaries a BHC has. Following Goetz et al. (2013), geographic complexity 
is measured by subtracting one from  BHC’s concentration of asset cross states that is calculated by 
Herﬁndahl–Hirschman index of BHC’s assets in each state in which it is active. Business complexity 
is estimated by non-interest income divided by operating income (Stiroh and Rumble 2006, Stiroh 
2004) at the parent BHC level. We interact these complexity measures with MBHC dummy in our 
main model. We find that the negative effect of MBHC_affiliate on Z-score is taken away once we 
control for organizational complexity and geographic complexity, but not business complexity. 
These results suggest that organizational complexity and geographic complexity are the main driver 
of the higher level of risk of MBHC affiliates compared to SBHC affiliates. This is consistent with 
our complexity hypothesis.  
We then consider stand-alone banks as a separate group in addition to SBHC and MBHC 
affiliates and compare its insolvency risk among the three groups. We find no significant difference 
in bank risk between stand-alone banks and SBHC affiliates. This result is not surprising, given that 
most SBHCs do not have non-bank subsidiaries and hence do not form an internal capital market 
within the SBHCs. In consistent with our main results, we find that MBHC affiliates are riskier than 
stand-alone banks.  
Finally, we compare the insolvency risks of SBHCs and MBHCs at the parent (the highest 
position in the bank structure hierarchy) instead of the subsidiary level. We find that MBHCs have 
lower insolvency risk than SBHCs. Overall, our findings that MBHC affiliates are riskier than 
SBHC affiliates at the subsidiary level but MBHCs have less risk than SBHCs at the parent level 
suggest that MBHCs take advantage of the internal capital market among subsidiaries to achieve 
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diversification benefits at the parent level, while allowing for higher level of risks in their individual 
subsidiaries. This evidence is consistent with Billett and Mauer (2003) finding that inefficient 
subsidies to financially constrained divisions significantly increase the excess value of diversified 
firms. It also explains to some extent the ongoing trend of forming MBHCs in the U.S. 
Our paper contributes to multiple strands of the literature. First, our paper is related to the 
literature that examines the impact of the internal capital market on BHC value. Cremers et al. 
(2011) examine the distribution of influence within the banking business group. Billett and Mauer 
(2003) investigate the relationship between the internal capital market and excess value of 
diversified firms. A number of previous studies, for example, Fauver et al. (2003), Lin and Servaes 
(2002) and Khanna and Palepu (2000), examine the link between capital market development and 
the value of diversification. Their evidence suggests that large diversified firms are better able to 
access external financing. Our results suggest that MBHC parents achieve diversification benefits 
by allowing their subsidiaries to take more risks than their SBHC counterparts.  
Second, our paper contributes to the recent growing literature on bank complexity   (Cetorelli 
et al. 2014, Cetorelli and Goldberg 2014, Liu et al. 2016). According to Cetorelli et al. (2014), 
studies on organizational complexity have policy importance because of its systemic risk 
implication in spreading shock across many affiliates within multiple industries in the financial 
sector. Studies on bank complexity, however, have not been documented comprehensively since the 
collapse of the banking system during the 2007-2009 financial crisis, which triggered the debate on 
the role of complex banks. Our paper finds that increased complexity at both organizational and 
geographic levels leads to increased insolvency risk of MBHC subsidiaries; however, these 
increased risks are diversified away at the parent level, resulting in an overall gain for MBHC 
parents.  
Third, our results comparing the insolvency risk between stand-alone banks and BHC 
affiliates extend the substantial literature comparing stand-alone and affiliated banks. This literature 
6 
 
has primarily focused on bank performance before and after acquisition (Pozdena 1988; Mayne 
1977, Piper and Weiss 1974, Ware 1973,Talley 1972) and with respect to cost efficiency (Yamori 
et al. 2003, Rose and Scott 1979) and dividend policy (Mayne 1980). 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews related literature and 
develops the two main hypotheses. Section 3 describes the data and summary statistics. The 
subsidiary results are presented in Section 4 while Second 5 reports results of the parent level. 
Section 6 concludes.  
 
2. Hypotheses development 
Diversification at the parent level enhances the parents’ ability to obtain better external 
financing deals to create internal capital market (Khanna and Palepu 2000). The internal capital 
market theory suggests that the creation of an internal capital market, where the headquarters 
allocate capital across different projects, could limit the distortions arising from external financing 
costs (Shin and Stulz 1998, Lamont 1997, Stein 1997). This theory has advanced the importance of 
its benefits for banks’ affiliates with a banking group. Houston et al. (1997) find that lending 
activities of bank subsidiaries are closely tied to the BHC’s capital position but not the cash flows 
at the subsidiary level. This evidence suggests that MBHCs create internal capital markets to 
allocate scarce capital within the organization. Building on Houston et al. (1997), Houston and 
James (1998) examine the relationship between organizational structure and bank lending by 
comparing lending behaviours of MBHC affiliates and that of unaffiliated banks. They find a lower 
cash flow sensitivity for affiliated banks, implying that holding company affiliation reduces the cost 
of raising funds externally. Cremers et al. (2011) further provide evidence that the headquarters of 
a retail banking group can provide their member banks with an intertemporal insurance function 
against funding shortfalls.  
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The creation of internal capital market is regarded as ‘source-of-strength’ effect. The 
‘source-of-strength’ doctrine states that a parent can raise internal funds by divesting a non-banking 
subsidiary to rescue a troubled banking subsidiary (Gilbert 1991). The too-big-to-fail resolution 
demonstrates the similar concept that counterparties of insolvent firm need protection to reduce 
collateral damage that was caused directly or indirectly by the failure of that firm (Kaufman 2014). 
Also, literature on business groups argues that business groups enable members to share risk by 
reallocating resources (Marisetty and Subrahmanyam 2010, Gopalan et al. 2007, Khanna and Yafeh 
2005, Ferris et al. 2003) or by reducing earnings volatility (Khanna and Yafeh 2007). Korte (2015) 
suggests to resolve insolvent banks by overcoming moral hazard problem and improving banks’ 
credit allocation in order to increase real economic performance. MBHCs have more subsidiaries 
than SBHCs and can, therefore, allow affiliates to access more internal resources than their SBHC 
counterparts. Hence, we postulate the first hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: MBHC affiliates have lower insolvency risk than SBHC affiliates  
However, the organizational complexity of U.S. BHCs has developed through an intensive 
process of consolidation and substantial acquisition over many subsidiaries (Cetorelli et al. 2014). 
The increased complexity in the MBHC structure may cast doubt on its bank affiliates’ insolvency 
risk.  
On the one hand, complexity theory posits that a competitive environment exists in the 
hierarchy structure (Pina e Cunha and Vieira da Cunha 2006, Anderson 1999). In a similar vein, 
Frankel (2013)’s study on large BHCs defines BHCs as a mall that owns financial shops. Due to the 
variety and interconnectedness of the shops, BHCs’ management often finds it difficult to manage 
their complex and varied shops.2 Each shop may be vulnerable to the risk taken by other shops in 
                                                 
2 MBHC subsidiaries are more likely to compete for financial resources from the parent (Baule, 2014), whereas SBHC 
affiliates find it easy to access their parent’s resources when necessary (Gilbert, 1991). Such a moral hazard problem is 
limited for SBHC subsidiaries because SBHCs have sole bank subsidiaries. When the parent controls a smaller set of 
subsidiaries, the internal capital market tends to enhance allocation efficiency and funding is allocated according to an 
internal ranking (Stein, 1997).  
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the mall. A banking system faces risk shifting if banks reduce capital to take more risk (Duran and 
Lozano-Vivas 2014). Evidence in the form of the threat of ‘poaching’ shows that managers of low-
growth subsidiaries can ‘poach’ the surplus of their high-growth counterparts (Rajan et al. 2000). 
Insufficient capital raises the high probability of bank failure; however, excessive capital increases 
unnecessary costs for banks, implying inefficient banking system (Chortareas et al. 2012). Such 
activities are associated with a high probability of financial distress among the subsidiaries.  
On the other hand, the agency problem between the managers of the parent and affiliates in 
the organizational hierarchy may lead to less efficient investments for subsidiaries (Rajan et al. 
2000, Scharfstein and Stein 2000). Managers of weak subsidiaries prefer larger capital budgets; 
however, they gain fewer private benefits from less productive investments. Therefore, they increase 
their bargaining power by negotiating compensation with the parent’s manager to entice them to 
stay. The parent’s managers react by offering additional compensation in the form of preferential 
capital budgeting allocations rather than cash wages. In order words, the parent’s managers distort 
capital allocations in favor of weak affiliates. 
An alternative view of the more complex structure (Kahn and Winton 2004) posits that 
institutions attempt to engage in loan switches to alter the risk postures of their subsidiaries. The 
reason is that the lending exposure related to different composition such as the maturity, the industry 
and the region is the common drivers of default risk (Memmel et al. 2015). Kahn and Winton (2004) 
argue that the parent tends to protect safe subsidiaries by granting them the most attractive low-risk 
loans, in contrast to the inefficient loans made to risky subsidiaries. DeYoung (2003) suggests that 
MBHC parents isolate riskier subsidiaries outside of the main bank to protect organizational assets.  
Hughes et al. (1999) and Deng and Elyasiani (2008) find that MBHCs operating over wider 
geographic ranges are more likely to be exposed to affiliation risk, which is in line with Berger and 
DeYoung (2001)’s argument that senior managers tend to concentrate on recently purchased remote 
subsidiaries. Their attention centers on the limited ability of the parent to provide equitable treatment 
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to all of its subsidiaries. Jennings et al. (2015) find that geographic complexity reduces the quality 
and quantity of management’s communication and increases the cost of gathering and analyzing 
information. Therefore, Goetz et al. (2013) suggest that geographic diversification of BHCs reduce 
BHC valuation and intensify agency problems. An increase in geographic diversification shifts the 
risk-return frontier more steeply upward, hence, a movement goes on the efficient risk-return 
frontier where higher risk-taking incentives are taken by BHC to exchange for higher return (Hughes 
et al. 1996).  
In addition to organizational and geographic complexity, banks also face business 
complexity. Cetorelli et al. (2014) argue that the boundaries of banking firms have progressively 
diversified into nonbank intermediaries and appeared in forms of increasingly complex BHCs. 
Black et al. (1978) highlight that risky activities are carried within holding company or nonbank 
affiliates rather than within the bank subsidiaries themselves. It is not obvious that operating under 
the same BHCs, bank subsidiaries are completely insulated from non-bank affiliaties (Wall 1987). 
The risky business activities of nonbank subsidiaries are likely to expose any threat of financial 
stability to bank subsidiary. Therefore, the increased organizational, geographic and business 
complexity associated with MBHC may result in the higher insolvency risk of MBHC subsidiaries.  
By combining the insights of different perspectives in complexity theory, we offer the 
second hypothesis as follows: 
Hypothesis 2: MBHC bank affiliates have higher insolvency risk than SBHC affiliates  
 
3. Empirical methods 
3.1. Data sample 
This study uses annual account data of commercial banks in the U.S. from 1994 to 2012 
obtained from the Call Reports. We begin the data analysis in 1994 for two reasons. First,                
Copeland (2012) reports that the largest banks began to organize as BHCs rather than being stand-
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alone commercial banks in 1994.3 Second, after 1994, banks were allowed to establish branches in 
other states. The complete structure of foreign-owned banks is unknown; therefore, we exclude 
foreign-owned banks from our sample. Our final data set includes 9,265 banks with 4,982 SBHC 
affiliates and 4,283 MBHC affiliates.  
 
3.2. Empirical methods 
To study the effect of bank type on bank insolvency risk, we use the following equation: 


 
n
i
ititiiit CONTROLSaffiliateMBHCscoreZ
1
110 _                                  (1) 
Following the recent literature on bank risk (Demirgüc-Kunt and Huizinga 2010, Laeven 
and Levine 2009), this study uses the Z-score as the main measure of insolvency risk. It is defined 
by the sum of return on assets (ROA) and the capital ratio, which is then divided by the standard 
deviation of ROA. The standard deviation of ROA is calculated over a four- and five-year rolling 
timeframe. MBHC_affiliate takes a value of 1 if the banks are MBHC affiliates, and 0 is assigned 
to SBHC affiliates. 𝜀𝑖𝑡 denotes the error term.  



n
i
itiCONTROLS
1
1 represents the control variables. We use one-year-lagged variables, 
including Log Total assets, Deposit/Total assets%, Loan/Total assets%, Off-balance-sheet 
(OBS)/Total assets%, Non-interest income/Operating income%, Cost-to-income%. Size is the 
logarithm of total assets and can be an important determinant of banks’ risk (Huang et al. 2012, 
Drehmann and Tarashev 2011, Tarashev et al. 2009). Demsetz and Strahan (1995) find evidence 
that size is an advantage, as larger institutions can more easily diversify risk. Hence, it is expected 
                                                 
3 The Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994 removed many restrictions on opening bank 
branches across state lines and permitted merger and acquisition through the holding company structure, which was the 
ﬁrst step in the deregulation process (Jayaratne and Strahan 1996).  
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that larger banks are safer. Deposit/Total assets%, which is deposits as a percentage of total assets, 
represents a crucial component of the liabilities of traditional commercial banks.  
  As Foos et al. (2010) point out, loan is regarded as an important driver of bank risk; therefore, 
loan ratio is employed in this study. Following previous studies on bank risk (Stiroh and Rumble 
2006), Loan/Total assets% is used to indicate the extent to which a bank is involved in traditional 
lending activities. Following Stiroh (2004), we capture income diversification as the ratio of non-
interest income as a percentage of total operating income to examine the extent to which a bank 
moved towards more volatile non-interest income. Lepetit et al. (2008) argue that banks with high 
non-interest income activities are riskier. Demsetz and Strahan (1997), on the other hand, find that 
economies of scale make large BHCs cost-effective in specializing in riskier activities. We follow 
the recent study on organization complexity in Cetorelli and Goldberg (2014) to measure 
organizational complexity by the total number of subsidiaries, which is equal to the number of bank 
subsidiaries plus the number of non-bank subsidiaries.  
 
3.3. Summary statistics 
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics of the Z-score and bank-specific variables for all 
banks, SBHC affiliates and MBHC affiliates. We winsorize all variables except size at the 1st and 
99th percentiles to minimize the impact of outliers. The correlation matrix for variables is displayed 
in Appendix. MBHCs tend to be riskier, larger, have lower Deposit/Total assets, but have higher 
OBS/Total assets and higher Non-interest income/Operating income.  
The last column in Table 1 indicates a significant difference in the means of variables 
between SBHC and MBHC affiliates. The results show that SBHC affiliates have higher Z-scores 
than MBHC affiliates (73.34 and 68.48, respectively), indicating that SBHC affiliates have lower 
insolvency risk than their MBHC counterparts. It appears that MBHC affiliates have a larger size, 
higher OBS items, and higher non-interest income, and are affiliated with larger banking 
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organizations than SBHC affiliates. In contrast, SBHC affiliates hold a higher proportion of deposit 
and are less cost-efficient than MBHC counterparts. On average, SBHCs have four subsidiaries, 
whereas MBHCs have 48. The mean of Log Total subsidiaries of MBHCs is significantly higher 
than that of SBHCs, implying that MBHCs are more complex than SBHCs.  
 
4. Risk comparisons between SBHC affiliates and MBHC affiliates 
In this section, we study the effect of bank structure on insolvency risk. First, we begin with 
the ordinary least squares model to provide our main finding. Second, we deal with endogeneity 
issues by employing PSM – based pairwise difference-in-differences approach  to provide consistent 
results. Third, we apply causal mediation analysis to prove the validity of our second hypothesis 
that MBHC affiliates are riskier due to their organizational, geographic and business complexity. 
 
4.1. Main results  
Table 2 reports the regression results of equation (1). Standard errors adjusted for 
heteroscedasticity and clustered at the bank level are displayed from this table onwards. Time fixed 
effects are included.  
As displayed in the first column of Table 2, the coefficient estimate for MBHC affiliates is 
negative and significant at the 1% level (-7.10), implying that MBHC affiliates are riskier than 
SBHC affiliates. The results are consistent for two Z-scores with a four-year and five-year rolling 
timeframe. Our finding supports the second hypothesis regarding complexity theory’s assumption 
of agency problems and competition for resources in the internal capital market (Rajan et al. 2000, 
Scharfstein and Stein 2000, Shin and Stulz 1998). Recent literature (Cetorelli et al. 2014, Cetorelli 
and Goldberg 2014) shows that the complexity of U.S. BHCs has developed through an intensive 
process of consolidation and substantial acquisition of many subsidiaries. The agency problem 
between the managers of the parent and affiliates in the organizational hierarchy may lead to 
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decreased investment efficiency at the subsidiary level (Rajan et al. 2000, Scharfstein and Stein 
2000).  
The more complex structure, modeled by Kahn and Winton (2004), posits that institutions 
attempt to engage in loan switches to alter the risk postures of their subsidiaries. A different strand 
of the argument on complexity sheds light on the fact that MBHC affiliates tend to be exposed to 
higher levels of risk when the number of subsidiaries in MBHCs increase. 
We find that larger banks tend to be safer. This is consistent with the argument on the 
diversification advantage of larger banks (Demsetz and Strahan 1995). However, banks highly 
engaging in lending activities are riskier, consistent with the finding of Stiroh and Rumble (2006). 
Banks with higher OBS/Total assets and Non-interest income/Operating income are riskier, 
consistent with the finding of Lepetit et al. (2008). Confirming the evidence provided by Demsetz 
and Strahan (1997), we find that banks with higher cost efficiency tend to be safer. 
 
4.2. Propensity score matching-based pairwise difference-in-differences approach 
The key result of the analysis reports that MBHC affiliates are riskier than SBHC affiliates. 
One may argue, however, that our findings of different levels of riskiness among banks may not be 
caused by the differences in bank types, e.g., SBHC or MBHC organizations, but are rather 
endogenous to the decisions made to become such bank types. We attempt to address this issue in 
this section.  
To extract the endogeneity caused by unobserved factors, we rely on those banks that change 
their status (for example, from SBHC affiliates to MBHC affiliates), within our sample period. We 
assume that banks that change status do not change their characteristics in a short period other than 
the level of risk before and after the status change. This strategy provides insights into whether 
SBHC affiliates changing into MBHC affiliates will increase or decrease their level of risk. In this 
analysis, we observe the following two groups: 
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(i) “status-changer”; that is, SBHC affiliates have changed into MBHC affiliates during 
the observation period (treatment group); 
(ii) “non-changer”; that is, SBHC affiliates that have not undertaken status changes into 
MBHC affiliates during the observation period (control group). 
Specifically, we use a propensity score matching-based pairwise difference-in-differences 
(PSM diff-in-diff) approach for this experiment to test the effect of status changes on the changes 
of insolvency risk of those banks. This is known as a difference-in-differences approach in which 
the first difference eliminates the unobserved heterogeneity and the second difference provides the 
impact estimate. As Blundell and Dias (2000) point out, a non-parametric PSM diff-in-diff has the 
potential to significantly improve the quality of non-experimental evaluation results.  
First, we run propensity score matching with the nearest-match method to match the control 
group with the treatment group year by year upon a vector of bank-specific variables, including 
bank size, deposit, loan, OBS, income diversification and cost-to-income ratios. Each status-changer 
is matched with an observation from the non-changer group of the same year that the status changed.  
Second, we pool the yearly matched status-changers and non-changers. The empirical setting 
requires us to restrict the matching to those with data from one year before and one year after the 
status changes. The process repeats for two-year and three-year windows.  
Third, we estimate the differences in the mean changes of Z-score between status changers 
and non-changers by the following diff-in-diff model:  


 
n
i
ititiiiit CONTROLSchangestatusPostscoreZ
1
110 _*                         (2) 
  iPost is a dummy variable equal to 1 for the time after changing status and 0 otherwise.  
ichangestatus _  equals 1 for status-changers and 0 for non-changers. This is a bank-specific 
attribute and does not vary by time. The variable of the primary interest in this set-up is the 
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interaction of ii changestatusPost _* , which shows the changes of the difference in bank risk 
between status-changers and non-changers before and after the status changes. Because we include 
both time and bank fixed effects in equation (2), both components of iPost  and ichangestatus _ are 
not included in the equation.  
The results of the diff-in-diff analysis are presented in Table 3. Regression (1) compares one 
year before and after the status changes. Regressions (3) and (5) compare two- and three-windows 
before and after the status changes, respectively.  
In three regressions, the interaction term of Post*Status_change is negative and significant, 
indicating that SBHC affiliates changing into MBHC affiliates tend to increase their level of risk as 
compared to those controlled SBHC affiliates with no such changes.  
For robustness check, we include all Post, Status_change and their interaction term 
(Post*Status_change) in our diff-in-diff model without controlling for bank and time fixed effects. 
The results are reported in model (2), (4) and (6). We found the consistent results with this 
alternative test. This experiment reaffirms our main finding that MBHC affiliates are riskier than 
SBHC counterparts.  
 
4.3. Channels 
Our evidence so far shows that MBHC affiliates are riskier than SBHC affiliates. In this 
section, we try to document the channels behind this difference. Since U.S. BHCs have developed 
substantial acquisition over many subsidiaries and across the U.S. (Cetorelli et al. 2014), their 
organizational and geographic complexity has substantially increased. The agency problem between 
the managers of the parent and affiliates in the organizational hierarchy may lead to less efficient 
investments for subsidiaries (Rajan et al. 2000, Scharfstein and Stein 2000). Jennings et al. (2015) 
find that geographic complexity reduces the quality and quantity of management’s communication 
and increase the cost of gathering and analyzing information. Therefore, Goetz et al. (2013) suggest 
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that geographic diversification of BHCs reduces BHC valuation and intensifies agency problems.  
In addition to organizational and geographic complexity, banks also face business complexity. 
Black et al. (1978) highlight that risky activities are carried within holding company or nonbank 
affiliates rather than within the bank subsidiaries themselves. It is not obvious that operating under 
the same BHCs, bank subsidiaries are completely insulated from non-bank affiliaties (Wall 1987). 
The causal mediation analysis recommended by Imai et al. (2011), Imai et al. (2010) and 
Judd and Kenny (1981) allows researchers to test competing theoretical explanations by identifying 
intermediate variables or mediators that lie in the causal pathway between the treatment and the 
outcome. If the treatment has no effect on the outcome once the mediators are controlled, one could 
conclude that the mediators totally mediate the effect of the treatment on the outcome (Judd and 
Kenny 1981). In this section, therefore, we test whether the higher level of insolvency risk for 
MBHC affiliates is due to the level of complexity at its parent level.  
Specifically, we employ three measures of complexity. They are organizational, geographic, 
and business complexity. First, the measure of organizational complexity is the total number of bank 
and non-bank subsidiaries at the BHC parent level. The number of non-bank subsidiaries is retrieved 
from the consolidated BHC data FR Y-9SP, and this data is available from 1998 onwards.4 
Therefore, the analysis includes bank-year observations from 1998 to 2012. Second, geographic 
complexity equals one minus BHC’s concentration of asset cross states that is measured by 
Herﬁndahl–Hirschman index of BHC’s assets in each state in which it is active (Goetz et al. 2013). 
Third, we follow Stiroh and Rumble (2006) and Stiroh (2004) to construct business complexity as 
non-interest income divided by operating income at the parent BHC level. We include the 
interaction of MBHC dummy with the three complexity measures, respectively, to the main 
                                                 
4 We downloaded number of non-bank subsidiaries of a BHC in WRDS database under the tab “Bank Regulatory - 
Bank Holding Companies”. The code of this variable is “BHCP2794 – Number of nonbank subsidiaries”.  
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regression. Table 4 reports the results of Z-score with four-year and five-year rolling windows to 
show the consistency of findings. 
The coefficients of all complexity measures in column (2), (3) and (4) of Table 4 are negative 
and significant at 1% level, suggesting that overall complexity, either organizational or geographical 
or business, is negatively related to bank safety. Complexity theory posits that a competitive 
environment exists in the hierarchy structure (Pina e Cunha and Vieira da Cunha 2006, Anderson 
1999). Evidence in the form of the threat of ‘poaching’ shows that managers of low-growth 
subsidiaries can ‘poach’ the surplus of their high-growth counterparts (Rajan et al. 2000). 
Insufficient capital raises the high probability of bank failure, implying inefficient banking system 
(Chortareas et al. (2012).  
As compared with model (1) of Table 4, model (2) and (3) show that the negative effect of 
MBHC_affiliate on Z-score found in model (1) is taken away once we control for organizational 
and geographic complexity, respectively, indicating that the difference in risk between MBHC and 
SBHC affiliates may be channeled from the bank’s organizational and geographic complexity at the 
parent level, in line with our second hypothesis. The interactions of MBHC_affiliate*Organizational 
complexity and MBHC*Geographical complexity are negative and significant at 1% level, 
indicating that banks affiliated with MBHCs holding more complex structure and greater 
geographical complexity are exposed to greater insolvency risk. However, model (4) shows that the 
coefficient of MBHC_affiliate remains significantly negative, implying that the significant 
difference between MBHC_affiliate and SBHC_affiliate as documented in the main regressions still 
exists even in the presence of the interaction between BHC’s business complexity and 
MBHC_affiliate. This result suggests that business complexity at the parent level is not the channel 
for the baseline results.  
We find that the interaction of MBHC_affiliate*business complexity is positive and 
significant. This finding suggests that the difference in Z-score between MBHC_affiliate and 
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SBHC_affiliate becomes smaller when the MBHC affiliates engage in more non-interest income 
activities to smooth out the volatility of returns, which in turn increases the Z-score, and hence bank 
stability. Our result is consistent with the finding of Wagner (2010) that diversification reduces bank 
failure. Zhang (2013) explains that non-interest income diversifies bank revenue by reducing the 
covariance between the net interest income and non-interest income, therefore, a reduction in the 
volatility of the net operating income. Gallo et al. (1996) find that mutual fund activities contribute 
to risk reduction and an increase in bank profitability for BHCs, and conclude that the risk reduction 
is a collective result of bank’s engagement in a wide range of new financial business lines.  
In an attempt to provide a robustness check for our main findings, we include three 
interaction terms between MBHC_affiliate with organizational/geographic/business complexity in 
our model and the results are reported in column (5) and (10) of Table 4. We find that the negative 
effect of MBHC_affiliate on Z-score found in model (1) of Table 4 is taken away once we include 
three interaction terms between MBHC_affiliate with organizational/geographic/business 
complexity in our model. These results are consistent with the ones reported in column (2), (3), (7) 
and (8) that the difference in risk between MBHC and SBHC affiliates may be channeled from the 
bank’s organizational and geographic complexity at the parent level, in line with our second 
hypothesis. 
 
4.4. Risk comparisons among stand-alone commercial banks, SBHC affiliates and MBHC 
affiliates 
We then consider stand-alone banks as a separate group in addition to SBHC and MBHC 
affiliates and compare the insolvency risk among the three groups in this section. Specifically, we 
include both SBHC_affiliate and MBHC_affiliate indicator variables in the model: 


 
n
i
ititiiiit CONTROLSaffiliateMBHCaffiliateSBHCscoreZ
1
1210 __           (3) 
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Where SBHC_affiliate equals 1 if the banks are SBHC affiliates, and 0 otherwise. 
MBHC_affiliate equals 1 if banks are MBHC affiliates, and 0 otherwise. Time fixed effects are 
included. Table 5 reports the results when a four-year and fiver-year rolling window of Z-score is 
considered.  
Table 5 shows that SBHC_affiliate is insignificant, indicating that bank insolvency risk is 
not different between stand-alone banks and SBHC affiliates. We find no significant difference in 
bank risk between stand-alone banks and SBHC affiliates. This result is not surprising, given that 
most SBHCs do not have non-bank subsidiaries and hence do not form an internal capital market 
within the SBHCs. In consistent with our main results, we find that MBHC affiliates are riskier than 
stand-alone banks.  
 
5. Risk comparison between SBHCs and MBHCs at the parent level 
The results in the previous sections suggest that MBHC affiliates have higher insolvency 
risk than both SBHC affiliates and stand-alone commercial banks, and this difference is driven by 
the level of organizational and geographic complexity at the BHC parent level. In this section, we 
examine the difference in insolvency risk between SBHCs and MBHCs at the parent level.  
It is widely perceived that BHCs have become substantially more complex by incorporating 
a large number of subsidiaries (Cetorelli et al. 2014). On the one hand, efficient internal capital 
market models particularly suggest that diversification creates value. That is the reason why earlier 
studies (Dimitrov and Tice 2006, Claessens et al. 1999, Stein 1997) conclude that diversification at 
the parent level leads to risk reduction in subsidiaries. On the other hand, Matsusaka and Nanda 
(2002) argue that diversification can be efficient or inefficient, depending on the characteristics of 
the firms. They put forward a theory of diversification discount based on the agency theory 
suggestion that the headquarters of the conglomerates themselves introduce another layer of agency 
problems among subsidiaries, causing diversification discount.  
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We use the consolidated BHC data as Y-9C reports from 1994 to 2012 and the following 
model:  


 
n
i
ititiiit CONTROLSparentMBHCscoreZ
1
110 _                                   (4)    
Where MBHC_parent equals 1 if the banks are an MBHC parents and 0 if they are SBHC 
parents. 𝜀𝑖𝑡 denotes the error term. Time fixed effects are included. Table 6 reports the results 
Our results show that there is a diversification gain at the BHC parent level. MBHCs are 
more geographically diversified than SBHCs, hence, the coinsurance effect associated with 
geographic diversification benefits the MBHC parent with lower insolvency risk at the parent level. 
According to portfolio theory, portfolio aggregates individual stocks to gain a diversification effect, 
provided that beta instability is inherent in the individual stocks. Confirming the portfolio view of 
banking, Demsetz and Strahan (1997) conclude that large banks are able to internally diversify and 
reduce the risk. Consistent with the portfolio theory view, although MBHC affiliates have a higher 
level of insolvency risk than their SBHC counterparts, the MBHC can achieve maximum 
diversification benefits at the parent level. 
 
6. Conclusion 
We conduct a risk comparison analysis of SBHC affiliates and MBHC affiliates. Using U.S. 
commercial bank data from 1994 to 2012, we find that MBHCs in the U.S. have lower insolvency 
risk than SBHCs at the parent level, but have significantly higher insolvency risk than the latter at 
the subsidiary levels. Our evidence suggests that MBHC parents tend to benefit from the internal 
capital market, while allowing for more risk taking at the individual levels. Our results provided by 
the PSM diff-in-diff approach suggest that SBHC affiliates changing into MBHC affiliates increase 
their level of risk more than those not changing status, which reaffirms our main finding. Our results 
are consistent with our hypotheses based on complexity theory – that MBHC affiliates face higher 
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risks than their SBHC affiliates because of the higher level of organizational and geographic 
complexity at the MBHC parent level.  
              The tendency toward expanding BHC regulation in general and that on commercial banks, 
in particular, is best illustrated by the central issue of this study. First, regulators should review the 
source-of-strength doctrine for BHCs to ensure that MBHC affiliates can receive bailouts from their 
parents in the event of future distress. Second, regulators should separately consider the risk 
exposure between banks affiliated with SBHCs and MBHCs. Third, this paper reveals investors’ 
preference for safe bank structures to achieve efficient investment portfolios. Our findings highlight 
the importance of government regulation on banks at both parent and subsidiary levels.  
 We acknowledge out data limitation that only accounting-based risk measure is used in this 
paper. The market-based measures such as distance-to-default and asset volatility measures based 
on KMV/Merton model require data from listed banks. However, our paper focuses mainly on banks 
at their subsidiary levels while most banks are listed at their parent or bank holding company levels. 
Therefore, the data limitations of listed banks restricted our ability to estimate market-based risk 
measures. 
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Table 1  
            
Descriptive statistics 
           
Variable  All banks   SBHC affiliates   MBHC affiliates t-test for 
difference  
in means 
 N  Mean Std   N Mean Std   N Mean Std 
Z-score 94,543 71.96 67.77 
 
67,732 73.34 69.48 
 
26,811 68.48 63.09 *** 
Log Total assets 94,543 11.83 1.34 
 
67,732 11.76 1.19 
 
26,811 12.02 1.64 *** 
Deposit/Total assets% 94,543 83.10 9.84 
 
67,732 84.12 6.81 
 
26,811 80.54 14.66 *** 
Loan/Total assets% 94,543 63.15 15.25 
 
67,732 63.19 14.48 
 
26,811 63.04 17.05 
 
OBS/Total assets% 94,543 1.68 2.35 
 
67,732 1.49 2.07 
 
26,811 2.14 2.92 *** 
Non-interest income/Operating income% 94,543 26.31 30.93 
 
67,732 25.53 28.08 
 
26,811 28.27 37.09 *** 
Cost-to-income% 94,543 101.64 88.93 
 
67,732 106.58 90.24 
 
26,811 89.16 84.24 *** 
Log Total subsidiaries 87699 0.53 0.93  63,460 0.09 0.34  24,239 1.68 0.99 *** 
Note: This table describes a number of observations, means and standard deviations on all the regression variables for all banks, SBHC affiliates and MBHC affiliates. The 
dependent variable is insolvency risk measured by Z-score. Z-score equals (return on assets + capital ratio) / Standard deviation of return on assets. The standard deviation 
of return on assets is calculated at the four-year rolling time. All independent variables are Log Total assets, Deposit/Total assets, Loan/Total assets, OBS/Total assets, 
Non-interest income/Operating income, Cost-to-income and, Log Total subsidiaries. Log Total assets is the logarithm of total assets. Deposit/Total assets is total deposits 
divided by total assets. Loan/Total assets is total loans divided by total assets. OBS/Total assets is off-balance-sheet activities divided by total assets. Non-interest 
income/Operating income is non-interest income divided by operating income. Cost-to-income is non-interest expense divided by operating income. Log Total subsidiaries 
is the logarithm of total subsidiaries (bank subsidiaries plus non-bank subsidiaries). In the last column, *** indicate a significant difference of mean at 1% levels between 
SBHC and MBHC affiliates. 
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Table 2 
 Main result: Analysis of insolvency risks between SBHC affiliates and MBHC 
affiliates 
Variable 4-year rolling   5-year rolling 
MBHC_affiliate -7.10*** 
 
-5.21***  
(0.94) 
 
(0.79) 
Log Total assetst-1 2.33*** 
 
1.51*** 
 
(0.39) 
 
(0.32) 
Deposit/Total assets%t-1 -0.10** 
 
-0.07 
 
(0.05) 
 
(0.04) 
Loan/Total assets%t-1  -0.55*** 
 
-0.48*** 
 
(0.03) 
 
(0.03) 
OBS/Total assets%t-1  -1.41*** 
 
-1.07*** 
 
(0.18) 
 
(0.15) 
Non-interest income/Operating income%t-1 -0.08*** 
 
-0.05*** 
 
(0.02) 
 
(0.01) 
Cost-to-income%t-1  -0.12*** 
 
-0.10*** 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.00)     
Year fixed effects Yes 
 
Yes 
Number of observations 84,582 
 
77,993 
R2 0.06   0.08 
Note: This table presents the results of insolvency risk comparison between SBHC affiliates and 
MBHC affiliates. The dependent variable is Z-score. Z-score is equal to (return on assets + capital 
ratio) / Standard deviation of return on assets. The standard deviation of return on assets is 
calculated at four-year and five-year rolling time. MBHC_affiliate is a dummy variable equal to 
1 if banks are MBHC affiliates and equal to 0 if banks are SBHC affiliates. All control variables 
are Log Total assets, Deposit/Total assets, Loan/Total assets, OBS/Total assets, Non-interest 
income/Operating income and Cost-to-income. Log Total assets is the logarithm of total assets. 
Deposit/Total assets is total deposits divided by total assets. Loan/Total assets is total loans 
divided by total assets. OBS/Total assets is off-balance-sheet activities divided by total assets. 
Non-interest income/Operating income is non-interest income divided by operating income. Cost-
to-income is non-interest expense divided by operating income. Standard errors are robust and 
clustered at bank level. The results for year fixed effects are not reported in the table. ***, ** and 
* denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
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Table 3         
Propensity score matching-based pairwise difference-in-differences for insolvency risk and status changes  
Variable 1-year window   2-year window   3-year window 
  (1) (2)   (3) (4)   (5) (6) 
Post*Status_change -14.91*** -15.41** 
 
-14.55*** -10.04** 
 
-10.48*** -6.09*  
(4.38) (6.53) 
 
(4.14) (4.12) 
 
(3.94) (3.48) 
Post 
 
-2.98 
  
-4.30 
  
-5.96**   
(3.75) 
  
(2.73) 
  
(2.30) 
Status_change 
 
-9.95*** 
  
-11.18*** 
  
-13.10***   
(3.77) 
  
(2.77) 
  
(2.36) 
Log Total assets -0.63 3.34** 
 
-4.41 3.12*** 
 
-0.50 2.86***  
(6.17) (1.32) 
 
(5.07) (0.97) 
 
(4.66) (0.82) 
Deposit /Total assets% -0.42 -0.40** 
 
-0.50** -0.37** 
 
-0.48** -0.32***  
(0.35) (0.19) 
 
(0.25) (0.14) 
 
(0.21) (0.12) 
Loan/Total assets% -0.16 -0.48*** 
 
-0.04 -0.45*** 
 
-0.09 -0.49***  
(0.26) (0.09) 
 
(0.17) (0.07) 
 
(0.14) (0.06) 
OBS/Total assets% 0.79 -1.42** 
 
-1.26* -1.37*** 
 
-1.40** -1.15***  
(1.32) (0.66) 
 
(0.72) (0.49) 
 
(0.62) (0.41) 
Non-interest income/Operating income% 0.04 -0.13* 
 
0.01 -0.09 
 
0.00 -0.08  
(0.07) (0.08) 
 
(0.06) (0.06) 
 
(0.05) (0.05) 
Cost-to-income% -0.07*** -0.15*** 
 
-0.07*** -0.16*** 
 
-0.08*** -0.16***  
(0.03) (0.02) 
 
(0.02) (0.02) 
 
(0.02) (0.01)          
Year fixed effects Yes No 
 
Yes No 
 
Yes No 
Bank fixed effects Yes No 
 
Yes No 
 
Yes No 
Number of observations 2,409 2,409 
 
4,471 4,471 
 
6,247 6,247 
Number of banks 1,256 1,256 
 
1,256 1,256 
 
1,256 1,256 
R2 0.05 0.08   0.04 0.07   0.04 0.07 
Note: This table presents the effect of status change on insolvency risk by using propensity score matching-based pairwise difference-in-differences. The 
dependent variable is Z-score. Z-score equals to (return on assets + capital ratio) / Standard deviation of return on asset. Standard deviation of return on asset 
is calculated at four-year rolling time. Post is dummy variable equals to 1 if year is the year after bank changes status. Status_change reflects the status 
transition from SBHC affiliates to MBHC affiliates. Status_change equals to 1 if banks change their status and 0 if banks do not change their status. Regression 
(1) and (2) compares 1 year before and 1 year after changing status. Regression (3) and (4) compares 2 years before and 2 years after changing status. 
Regression (5) and (6) compares 3 years before and 3 years after changing status. Log Total assets is logarithm of total asset. Deposit/Total assets is total 
deposits divided by total assets. Loan/Total assets is total loans divided by total assets. OBS/Total assets is off-balance-sheet activities divided by total assets. 
Non-interest income/Operating income is non-interest income divided by operating income. Cost-to-income ratio is non-interest expense divided by operating 
income. ***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level. 
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Table 4 
          
 
Complexity 
          
 
Variable 4-year rolling         5-year rolling     
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)   (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
MBHC_affiliate -6.84*** 1.22 3.20 -14.90*** 1.53 
 
-5.04*** 0.62 2.55 -10.29*** 4.52  
(0.97) (1.55) (2.44) (1.90) (4.82) 
 
(0.78) (1.27) (2.11) (1.53) (3.78) 
MBHC_affiliate * Organizational complexityt-1 -1.70*** 
  
-2.10*** 
  
-1.40*** 
  
-1.36***   
(1.48) 
  
(1.86) 
  
(1.14) 
  
(1.43) 
MBHC_affiliate * Geographic complexityt-1 
  
-28.24*** 
 
-28.77*** 
  
-20.07*** 
 
-20.69***    
(5.87) 
 
(5.71) 
   
(4.93) 
 
(4.40) 
MBHC_affiliate * Business complexityt-1 
   
0.11*** 0.12*** 
    
0.07** 0.07**     
(0.03) (0.04) 
    
(0.03) (0.03) 
Log Total assetst-1 2.03*** 2.76*** 1.45** 1.76*** 2.55*** 
 
1.46*** 2.11*** 0.93** 1.40*** 2.29***  
(0.39) (0.42) (0.69) (0.54) (0.70) 
 
(0.31) (0.34) (0.60) (0.45) (0.55) 
Deposit /Total assets%t-1 -0.10* -0.14*** 0.005 0.09 -0.06 
 
-0.06 -0.10** 0.07 0.08 -0.01  
(0.05) (0.05) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) 
 
(0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) 
Loan/Total assets%t-1  -0.56*** -0.56*** -0.34*** -0.35*** -0.37*** 
 
-0.47*** -0.48*** -0.31*** -0.31*** -0.30***  
(0.03) (0.03) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) 
 
(0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) 
OBS/Total assets%t-1  -1.30*** -1.21*** -1.02*** -1.14*** -0.69** 
 
-1.04*** -0.97*** -0.67*** -0.89*** -0.58***  
(0.19) (0.18) (0.27) (0.23) (0.27) 
 
(0.15) (0.15) (0.24) (0.19) (0.21) 
Non-interest income/Operating income%t-1 -0.07*** -0.06*** 0.007 -0.007 0.06 
 
-0.05*** -0.05*** 0.01 -0.009 0.05  
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) 
Cost-to-income%t-1  -0.12*** -0.12*** -0.14*** -0.12*** -0.14*** 
 
-0.10*** -0.10*** -0.11*** -0.09*** -0.11***  
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
 
(0.00) (0.004) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) 
Organizational complexityt-1 
 
-5.94*** 
  
-9.87*** 
  
-4.85*** 
  
-8.24***   
(1.35) 
  
(1.55) 
  
(1.85) 
  
(1.16) 
Geographical complexityt-1 
  
-18.98*** 
 
-22.51*** 
  
-14.39*** 
 
-18.08***    
(4.06) 
 
(3.85) 
   
(3.53) 
 
(3.01) 
Business complexityt-1 
   
-0.11*** -0.09*** 
    
-0.06** -0.05**     
(0.03) (0.03) 
    
(0.02) (0.02)             
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 78,266 78,266 20,986 30,204 20,674 
 
77,565 77,565 19.376 27,782 20,447 
R2 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.09   0.08 0.08 0.10 0.08 0.10 
Note: This table presents the results of channels via organizational complexity, geographical complexity and business complexity. The dependent variable is Z-score. Z-score equals to (return on assets + capital ratio) / 
Standard deviation of return on asset. Standard deviation of return on asset is calculated at four-year and  five-year rolling time.  MBHC_affiliate is a dummy variable equal to 1 if banks are MBHC affiliates and equal to 
0 if banks are SBHC affiliates. Log Total assets is logarithm of total asset. Deposit/Total assets is total deposits divided by total assets. Loan/Total assets is total loans divided by total assets. OBS/Total assets is off-
balance-sheet activities divided by total assets. Non-interest income/Operating income is non-interest income divided by operating income. Cost-to-income ratio is non-interest expense divided by operating income. 
Organizational complexity is Log Total subsidiaries equal to logarithm of total subsidiaries (bank subsidiaries plus non-bank subsidiaries). Geographic complexity equals one minus the Herﬁndahl–Hirschman index of 
BHC’s assets across states.  Business complexity is non-interest income/Operating income at the BHC level. Standard errors are robust and clustered at bank level. The results for year fixed effects are not reported in the 
table. ***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level. 
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Table 5    
Analysis of insolvency risk between stand-alone commercial banks, SBHC affiliates 
and MBHC affiliates 
Variable 4-year rolling   5-year rolling 
SBHC_affiliate 0.09 
 
1.37  
(1.26) 
 
(1.04) 
MBHC_affiliate -6.64*** 
 
-3.45**  
(1.40) 
 
(1.17) 
Log Total assetst-1 1.93*** 
 
1.14*** 
 
(0.37) 
 
(0.30) 
Deposit/Total assets%t-1 -0.11** 
 
-0.07* 
 
(0.04) 
 
(0.04) 
Loan/Total assets%t-1  -0.60*** 
 
-0.51*** 
 
(0.03) 
 
(0.02) 
OBS/Total assets%t-1  -1.47*** 
 
-1.15*** 
 
(0.17) 
 
(0.14) 
Non-interest income/Operating income%t-1 -0.13*** 
 
-0.09*** 
 
(0.02) 
 
(0.01) 
Cost-to-income%t-1  -0.11*** 
 
-0.09*** 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.004)     
Year fixed effects Yes 
 
Yes 
Number of observations 103,159 
 
94,640 
R2 0.07   0.08 
Note: This table presents the results of insolvency risk comparison among stand-alone banks, SBHC 
affiliates and MBHC affiliates. The dependent variable is Z-score. Z-score equals (return on assets + 
capital ratio) / Standard deviation of return on assets. The standard deviation of return on assets is 
calculated at four-year and five-year rolling time. SBHC_affiliate is a dummy variable equal to 1 if 
banks are SBHC affiliates and 0 otherwise. MBHC_affiliate is a dummy variable equal to 1 if banks 
are MBHC affiliates and 0 otherwise. All control variables are Log Total assets, Deposit/Total assets, 
Loan/Total assets, OBS/Total assets, Non-interest income/Operating income and Cost-to-income. Log 
Total assets is the logarithm of total assets. Deposit/Total assets is total deposits divided by total assets. 
Loan/Total assets is total loans divided by total assets. OBS/Total assets is off-balance-sheet activities 
divided by total assets. Non-interest income/Operating income is non-interest income divided by 
operating income. Cost-to-income is non-interest expense divided by operating income. Standard 
errors are robust and clustered at the bank level. The results for year fixed effects are not reported in 
the table. ***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
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Table 6 
   
Analysis of insolvency risk between SBHCs and MBHCs at parent level 
Variable 4-year rolling   5-year rolling 
MBHC 8.58*** 
 
7.61***  
(2.56) 
 
(2.28) 
Log Total assetst-1 -1.31 
 
-2.11** 
 
(0.99) 
 
(0.86) 
Loan/Total assets%t-1  -0.56*** 
 
-0.50*** 
 
(0.08) 
 
(0.07) 
OBS/Total assets%t-1  -0.31 
 
-0.17 
 
(0.79) 
 
(0.68) 
Non-interest income/Operating income%t-1 0.10*** 
 
0.10*** 
 
(0.04) 
 
(0.03) 
Cost-to-income%t-1  -0.23*** 
 
-0.21*** 
 
(0.02) 
 
(0.01) 
Log Total subsidiariest-1 -7.01*** 
 
-5.85*** 
 
(1.42) 
 
(1.24)     
Year fixed effects Yes 
 
Yes 
Number of observations 15,289 
 
15,296 
R2 0.11   0.12 
Note: This table presents the results of insolvency risk comparison between SBHCs and MBHCs at a 
parent level. The dependent variable is Z-score. Z-score equals (return on assets + capital ratio) / Standard 
deviation of return on assets. The standard deviation of return on assets is calculated at four-year and five-
year rolling time. MBHC is a dummy variable equal to 1 if banks are MBHCs and 0 if banks are SBHCs. 
All control variables are Log Total assets, Loan/Total assets, OBS/Total assets, Non-interest 
income/Operating income, Cost-to-income  and Log Total subsidiaries. Log Total assets is the logarithm 
of total assets. Loan/Total assets is total loans divided by total assets. OBS/Total assets is off-balance-
sheet activities divided by total assets. Non-interest income/Operating income is non-interest income 
divided by operating income. Cost-to-income ratio is non-interest expense divided by operating income. 
Log Total subsidiaries is the logarithm of total subsidiaries (bank subsidiaries plus non-bank subsidiaries). 
Standard errors are robust and clustered at the bank level. The results for year fixed effects are not reported 
in the table. ***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
 
 
33 
 
Appendix          
Correlation matrix     
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
(1) MBHC dummy  1 
        
(2) Z-score  -0.03* 1 
       
(3) Log Total assets 0.09* -0.01* 1 
      
(4) Deposit/Total assets% -0.16* -0.02* -0.26* 1 
     
(5) Loan/Total assets% -0.004 -0.09*  0.17* 0.09* 1 
    
(6) OBS/Total assets% 0.12* -0.06* 0.49* -0.15* 0.19* 1 
   
(7) Non-interest income/Operating income% 0.04* -0.13* 0.12* -0.24* -0.19* 0.09* 1 
  
(8) Cost-to-income% -0.09* -0.19* -0.05* 0.006 -0.14* 0.0009 0.66* 1 
 
(9) Log Total subsidiaries 0.76* -0.04* 0.32* -0.29* 0.02* 0.26* 0.10* -0.09* 1 
Note: (1) MBHC dummy, (2) Z-score, (3) Log Total assets, (4) Deposit/Total assets%, (5) Loan/Total assets%, (6) OBS/Total assets%, (7) Non-interest 
income/Operating income%, (8) Cost-to-income%, (9) Log Total subsidiaries. MBHC dummy variable equals 1 if banks are MBHC affiliates and 0 if banks are SBHC 
affiliates. Z-score equals (return on assets + capital ratio) / Standard deviation of return on assets. The standard deviation of return on assets is calculated at the four-
year rolling time. Log Total assets is the logarithm of total assets. Deposit/Total assets is total deposits divided by total assets. Loan/Total assets is total loans divided 
by total assets. OBS/Total assets is off-balance-sheet activities divided by total assets. Non-interest income/Operating income is non-interest income divided by 
operating income. Cost-to-income is non-interest expense divided by operating income. Log Total subsidiaries is the logarithm of total subsidiaries (bank subsidiaries 
plus non-bank subsidiaries). * denotes significance at the 1% level.  
 
 
